⎇ 72758e75ce515f355f27615671c95ecaf8c2a8bc
crates/shared/ente-incarnate/src/caps.rs
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1//! Detección runtime de capacidades del kernel/proceso para aislamiento.
2//!
3//! Esto NO se cachea entre instancias — sysctls pueden cambiar entre boot, y
4//! cgroup delegation depende del proceso concreto. Cada `Incarnator::new`
5//! hace su detección al construirse.
6
7use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
8
9#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
10pub struct CapabilitySet {
11 pub kernel_version: (u32, u32, u32),
12 pub has_cap_sys_admin: bool,
13 pub user_ns: UserNsStatus,
14 pub cgroup_v2: CgroupStatus,
15 pub cgroup_delegated: bool,
16 pub max_user_namespaces: Option<u64>,
17 pub our_cgroup: Option<PathBuf>,
18}
19
20#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
21pub enum UserNsStatus {
22 Allowed,
23 DisabledBySysctl,
24 RestrictedByLsm,
25 Unknown,
26}
27
28impl UserNsStatus {
29 pub fn is_allowed(&self) -> bool {
30 matches!(self, UserNsStatus::Allowed)
31 }
32}
33
34#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
35pub enum CgroupStatus {
36 Unified,
37 Hybrid,
38 Legacy,
39 NotMounted,
40}
41
42impl CapabilitySet {
43 pub fn detect() -> Self {
44 Self {
45 kernel_version: detect_kernel_version().unwrap_or((0, 0, 0)),
46 has_cap_sys_admin: detect_cap_sys_admin(),
47 user_ns: detect_user_ns(),
48 cgroup_v2: detect_cgroup_status(),
49 cgroup_delegated: detect_cgroup_delegated(),
50 max_user_namespaces: read_u64("/proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces"),
51 our_cgroup: detect_our_cgroup(),
52 }
53 }
54
55 /// ¿Podemos crear el namespace `ns`?
56 /// Reglas:
57 /// - user → necesita user_ns Allowed (o ya tener CAP_SYS_ADMIN, en cuyo caso no se crea uno nuevo).
58 /// - resto → CAP_SYS_ADMIN, o crearlos junto con user ns nuevo.
59 pub fn can_create_ns(&self, kind: NsKind) -> bool {
60 match kind {
61 NsKind::User => self.user_ns.is_allowed() || self.has_cap_sys_admin,
62 _ => {
63 self.has_cap_sys_admin
64 || (self.user_ns.is_allowed() && self.max_user_namespaces.unwrap_or(0) > 0)
65 }
66 }
67 }
68}
69
70#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
71pub enum NsKind {
72 Mount,
73 Pid,
74 Net,
75 Uts,
76 Ipc,
77 User,
78 Cgroup,
79}
80
81impl NsKind {
82 pub fn name(self) -> &'static str {
83 match self {
84 NsKind::Mount => "mount",
85 NsKind::Pid => "pid",
86 NsKind::Net => "net",
87 NsKind::Uts => "uts",
88 NsKind::Ipc => "ipc",
89 NsKind::User => "user",
90 NsKind::Cgroup => "cgroup",
91 }
92 }
93}
94
95fn detect_kernel_version() -> Option<(u32, u32, u32)> {
96 let s = std::fs::read_to_string("/proc/sys/kernel/osrelease").ok()?;
97 let head = s.split(|c: char| !c.is_ascii_digit() && c != '.').next()?;
98 let mut it = head.split('.');
99 let a = it.next()?.parse().ok()?;
100 let b = it.next()?.parse().ok()?;
101 let c = it.next().and_then(|x| x.parse().ok()).unwrap_or(0);
102 Some((a, b, c))
103}
104
105fn detect_cap_sys_admin() -> bool {
106 // euid 0 implica caps por default. Modo simple: si euid==0, asumimos CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
107 // Podríamos parsear /proc/self/status > CapEff, pero para nuestros usos el
108 // discriminador útil es root vs no-root.
109 nix::unistd::geteuid().is_root()
110}
111
112fn detect_user_ns() -> UserNsStatus {
113 // Sysctl tradicional Debian/Ubuntu pre-24.
114 if let Some(v) = read_u64("/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone") {
115 if v == 0 {
116 return UserNsStatus::DisabledBySysctl;
117 }
118 }
119 // AppArmor restriction (Ubuntu 24+). 1 = restringido, 2 = restricción aplicada.
120 if let Some(v) = read_u64("/proc/sys/kernel/apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns") {
121 if v >= 1 {
122 return UserNsStatus::RestrictedByLsm;
123 }
124 }
125 if let Some(0) = read_u64("/proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces") {
126 return UserNsStatus::DisabledBySysctl;
127 }
128 UserNsStatus::Allowed
129}
130
131fn detect_cgroup_status() -> CgroupStatus {
132 // /sys/fs/cgroup montado como cgroup2 → unified.
133 let mounts = match std::fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/mountinfo") {
134 Ok(s) => s,
135 Err(_) => return CgroupStatus::NotMounted,
136 };
137 let mut has_v2 = false;
138 let mut has_v1 = false;
139 for line in mounts.lines() {
140 // formato: ... - <fstype> <source> <opts>
141 let parts: Vec<&str> = line.split(" - ").collect();
142 if parts.len() < 2 {
143 continue;
144 }
145 let tail = parts[1];
146 let fields: Vec<&str> = tail.split_whitespace().collect();
147 if fields.is_empty() {
148 continue;
149 }
150 match fields[0] {
151 "cgroup2" => has_v2 = true,
152 "cgroup" => has_v1 = true,
153 _ => {}
154 }
155 }
156 match (has_v2, has_v1) {
157 (true, false) => CgroupStatus::Unified,
158 (true, true) => CgroupStatus::Hybrid,
159 (false, true) => CgroupStatus::Legacy,
160 (false, false) => CgroupStatus::NotMounted,
161 }
162}
163
164fn detect_our_cgroup() -> Option<PathBuf> {
165 let s = std::fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/cgroup").ok()?;
166 let rel = s.lines().find_map(|l| l.strip_prefix("0::"))?.trim();
167 let abs = if rel == "/" {
168 PathBuf::from("/sys/fs/cgroup")
169 } else {
170 PathBuf::from(format!("/sys/fs/cgroup{rel}"))
171 };
172 Some(abs)
173}
174
175fn detect_cgroup_delegated() -> bool {
176 // Heurística: ¿podemos escribir cgroup.subtree_control en nuestro cgroup
177 // o crear subdirectorios? En cgroup v2 con Delegate=yes, el dueño es el uid
178 // del usuario y `access(W_OK)` sobre el directorio devuelve OK.
179 let Some(p) = detect_our_cgroup() else { return false };
180 use nix::unistd::{access, AccessFlags};
181 access(&p, AccessFlags::W_OK).is_ok()
182}
183
184fn read_u64(path: &str) -> Option<u64> {
185 let s = std::fs::read_to_string(Path::new(path)).ok()?;
186 s.trim().parse().ok()
187}
188
189#[cfg(test)]
190mod tests {
191 use super::*;
192
193 #[test]
194 fn detect_does_not_panic() {
195 let _ = CapabilitySet::detect();
196 }
197
198 #[test]
199 fn ns_kind_names_unique() {
200 let names = [
201 NsKind::Mount.name(),
202 NsKind::Pid.name(),
203 NsKind::Net.name(),
204 NsKind::Uts.name(),
205 NsKind::Ipc.name(),
206 NsKind::User.name(),
207 NsKind::Cgroup.name(),
208 ];
209 let mut sorted = names.to_vec();
210 sorted.sort();
211 sorted.dedup();
212 assert_eq!(sorted.len(), names.len());
213 }
214}